The Unsuccessful Effort to Revise the Uniform Determination of Death Act.

This Viewpoint summarizes the major issues that led to the decision to draft a revision of the Uniform Determination of Death Act, the alternatives that were considered, why there was failure to reach consensus, and what this means for the future.

Brain Death: Ethical and Legal Challenges.

Although the fundamental principle behind the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), the equivalence of death by circulatory-respiratory and neurologic criteria, is accepted throughout the United States and much of the world, some families object to brain death/death by neurologic criteria. Clinicians struggle to address these objections. Some objections have been brought to court, particularly in the United States, leading to inconsistent outcomes and discussion about potential modifications to the UDDA to minimize ethical and legal controversies related to the determination of brain death/death by neurologic criteria.

Legal and Ethical Challenges in the Care of the Pregnant Patient After Brain Death.

ABSTRACT: Using two scenarios based on real-life cases reported in the media, this article examines the ethical and legal controversies that arise when a pregnant woman dies based on neurologic criteria while her fetus remains alive. In the first scenario, all parties agreed to maintain physiologic support until a safe delivery could be achieved, whereas in the second scenario the woman's family sought a legal remedy to stop the hospital from continuing to provide physiologic support for the patient and her neurologically devastated fetus.

Building a Fence Around Brain Death: The Shielded-Brain Formulation.

The concept of brain death was proposed more than 50 years ago, and it has been incorporated in laws and clinical practice, but it remains a source of confusion, debate, and litigation. Because of persistent variability in clinical standards and ongoing controversies regarding policies, the Uniform Law Commission, which drafted the Uniform Determination of Death Act in 1980, has appointed a committee to study whether the act should be revised. This article reviews the history of the concept of brain death and its philosophical underpinnings, summarizes the objections that have been raised to the prevailing philosophical formulations, and proposes a new formulation that addresses those objections while preserving current practices.

Experiences of Families Following Organ Donation Consent: A Qualitative Systematic Review.

OBJECTIVE: This systematic review synthesizes qualitative evidence on the experiences of donor families after consent to organ donation. METHODS: This robust, qualitative systematic review included an exhaustive search of electronic databases, including PubMed, Scopus, EBSCO PsycINFO, and CINAHL Complete. Manual searches of reference lists and gray literature were conducted to achieve a comprehensive identification of all relevant research. A qualitative study design served to capture the experiences of donor families after organ donation consent. RESULTS: A total of 6 articles that met the eligibility criteria were identified and included in this review. Three key themes emerged from the primary research: 1. family members were ambivalent about consent due to the ambiguity of brain death; 2. conversations about donation requirements proved uncomfortable; and 3. support is needed after donation. CONCLUSIONS: Family members demonstrated ongoing ambivalence and distress that lasted for weeks after organ donation due to the ambiguity of brain death. Some family members were unhappy with having been approached for a conversation about organ donation. Donor families were not always able to deal with the difficulties they faced after their decision about organ donation. Health care professionals should provide ongoing care and updated information to family members. This review helped to identify family members' needs for both psychological and financial assistance.

New perspectives on brain death.

Brain death, or death by neurological criteria (BD/DNC), has been accepted conceptually, medically and legally for decades. Nevertheless, some areas remain controversial or understudied, pointing to a need for focused research to advance the field. Multiple recent contributions have increased our understanding of BD/DNC, solidified our practice and provided guidance where previously lacking. There have also been important developments on a global scale, including in low-to-middle income countries such as in South America. Although variability in protocols and practice still exists, new efforts are underway to reduce inconsistencies and better train practitioners in accurate and sound BD/DNC determination. Various legal challenges have required formal responses from national societies, and the American Academy of Neurology has filled this void with much needed guidance. Questions remain regarding concepts such as 'whole brain' versus 'brainstem' death, and the intersection of BD/DNC and rubrics of medical futility. These concepts are the subject of this review.

Effect of Opt-out System for Organ Donation After Brain Death on Ethical Legitimacy and Potential Efficacy in a Mathematical Model.

OBJECTIVES: We aimed to compare the possible outcomes of the current (opt-in) system and an opt-out system for organ donation in South Korea using a mathematical model. MATERIALS AND METHODS: A structured questionnaire was used to investigate the decision on organ donation and family consent after brain death under the current system and an opt-out system. The survey was conducted in August 2018 by means of a voluntary survey of 100 opposite-sex married couples. RESULTS: Sixty-three percent of participants wished to self-donate their organs after brain death: 69.5% were positive and 30.5% were negative regarding the implementation of the opt-out system. Among 200 participants, the total number of possible donors increased from 110 (55.0%) in the current system to 139 (69.5%) in the opt-out system. Positive autonomy was defined as obtainment of consent from the donor and the spouse, and negative autonomy was defined as concordaence of refusal between the donor and the spouse. Comparisons between the systems showed that the rate of autonomy increased from 57.0% in the current system to 61.5% in the opt-out system. Although the achievement of positive autonomy increased from 59.5% in the current system to 74.6% in the opt-out system, the achievement of negative autonomy decreased from 52.7% in the current system to 39.2% in the opt-out system. CONCLUSIONS: An opt-out system can increase the number of organ donors; however, achievement of negative autonomy can decrease.

Defining Death: Lessons From the Case of Jahi McMath.

Death is defined biologically as the irreversible loss of the functioning of the organism as a whole, which typically occurs after the loss of cardiorespiratory function. In 1968, a Harvard committee proposed that death could also be defined neurologically as the irreversible loss of brain function. Brain death has been considered to be equivalent to cardiorespiratory arrest on the basis of the belief that the brain is required to maintain functioning of the organism as a whole and that without the brain, cardiorespiratory arrest and biological death are both rapid and certain. Over the past 20 years, however, this equivalence has been shown to be false on the basis of numerous cases of patients correctly diagnosed as brain-dead who nevertheless continued to survive for many years. The issue reached national attention with the case of Jahi McMath, a young woman diagnosed as brain-dead after a surgical accident, who survived for almost 5 years, mostly at home, supported with a ventilator and tube feedings. The fact that brain death is not biological death has many implications, notably including the concern that procurement of organs from brain-dead donors may not comply with the so-called dead donor rule, which requires that vital organs be procured from patients only after they are dead. In this article, I conclude with an analysis of options for moving forward and among them advocate for reframing brain death as a "social construct," with implicit societal acceptance that patients diagnosed as brain-dead may be treated legally and ethically the same as if they were biologically dead.

Legal and Ethical Considerations for Requiring Consent for Apnea Testing in Brain Death Determination.

The past decade has witnessed escalating legal and ethical challenges to the diagnosis of death by neurologic criteria (DNC). The legal tactic of demanding consent for the apnea test, if successful, can halt the DNC. However, US law is currently unsettled and inconsistent in this matter. Consent has been required in several trial cases in Montana and Kansas but not in Virginia and Nevada. In this paper, we analyze and evaluate the legal and ethical bases for requiring consent before apnea testing and defend such a requirement by appealing to ethical and legal principles of informed consent and battery and the right to refuse medical treatment. We conclude by considering and rebutting two major objections to a consent requirement for apnea testing: (1) a justice-based objection to allocate scarce resources fairly and (2) a social utility objection that halting the diagnosis of brain death will reduce the number of organ donors.

Sobre la «resucitación porcina», la muerte y la donación de órganos / About «porcine resuscitation», death and organ donation

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Ethical Issues in Organ Transplantation at End of Life: Defining Death.

End-of-life vital organ transplantation involves singular ethical issues, because survival of the donor is impossible, and organ retrieval is ideally as close to the death of the donor as possible to minimize organ ischemic time. Historical efforts to define death have been met with confusion and discord. Fifty years on, the Harvard criteria for brain death continue to be problematic and now face significant legislative efforts to limit their authority.

The Determination of Death under Polish Law in Comparative, Historical and Medical Perspective.

It has been recently adopted under Polish law that the determinant of death is both the brain death criterion, tantamount to the permanent and irreversible cessation of its function, and the equally valid circulatory criterion. This means that the determination of brain death is not indispensable to pronounce a person dead, because the irreversible cessation of circulation is sufficient in this respect. The purpose of this article is to present current developments in Polish law against the comparative, historical and medical background.